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Abstract—Advances in graphics and machine learning have led
to the general availability of easy-to-use tools for modifying and
synthesizing media. The proliferation of these tools threatens
to cast doubt on the veracity of all media. One approach
to thwarting the flow of fake media is to detect modified or
synthesized media through machine learning methods. While
detection may help in the short term, we believe that it is destined
to fail as the quality of fake media generation continues to
improve. Soon, neither humans nor algorithms will be able to
reliably distinguish fake versus real content. Thus, pipelines for
assuring the source and integrity of media will be required—
and increasingly relied upon. We propose AMP, a system that
ensures the authentication of media via certifying provenance.
AMP creates one or more publisher-signed manifests for a media
instance uploaded by a content provider. These manifests are
stored in a database allowing fast lookup from applications such
as browsers. For reference, the manifests are also registered
and signed by a permissioned ledger, implemented using the
Confidential Consortium Framework (CCF). CCF employs both
software and hardware techniques to ensure the integrity and
transparency of all registered manifests. AMP, through its use
of CCF, enables a consortium of media providers to govern the
service while making all its operations auditable. The authenticity
of the media can be communicated to the user via visual elements
in the browser, indicating that an AMP manifest has been
successfully located and verified.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in graphics and machine learning have enabled
the creation and distribution of easy-to-use tools for synthesiz-
ing fake media. These tools enable non-expert users to modify
or synthesize audiovisual media that looks convincingly real.
Although subtle artifacts may be detected in some cases by
experts or by statistical classifiers developed with machine
learning, we expect that the march of technical advances will
soon make it impossible to distinguish fake media from real.
Tools for media synthesis, coupled with wide-scale distribution
of social media, threaten to cause harm to individuals, insti-
tutions, and nations. More generally, widespread distribution
of fake media has the potential to undermine societys trust in
the veracity of all media. With the rise of fake media, what
can be done to protect the veracity of media and provide a
pathway to trust?
We are pursuing an answer by providing users with reliable
information about the source and authenticity of a media
object, through a verifiable and trustworthy media authen-
tication service. That should allow the consumer to rely
on the reputation of the media producer to make informed
decisions about the medias trustworthiness. For example, a
media company or publisher can attest that it published a
work in accordance with their editorial standards, or content
captured at a certain location and time by cameras in the hands
of a trusted reporting team.
The simplest building block for proving provenance is
to sign the media object digitally. However, the variety of
mechanisms for media distribution, with many of them mod-
ifying the media files or streams, means that maintaining
digital signatures is difficult. Additional challenges are also
involved. For example, in a typical redistribution scenario,
media content is re-encoded by a content distribution network
(CDN). Such re-encodings are needed to address variations
in channel bandwidth, rendering device resolution, and other
constraints. To preserve provenance information, certificates
must be tracked and re-inserted for each transformation.
We present a practical system named AMP (for
authentication of media via provenance) aimed at providing
robust verification of provenance while supporting a wide
variety of production and distribution scenarios at Internet
scale. We propose AMP as an approach to mitigating the
negative societal impact of fake/synthetic media, based on cer-
tifiable provenance. The AMP effort brings together expertise
in security and media, leveraging advances in cryptography,
watermarking, and recently released cloud security and ledger
services.
Threats to the integrity of sources include the use of a
range of techniques, from simple modifications of timing to
more sophisticated uses of graphics and generative models,
for manipulating or synthesizing audiovisual content that is
perceived by consumers as capturing actual events.
Approaches to securing media from a reputable provider
to its consumption include (1) strong authentication and (2)
fragile watermarking. A complementary approach involves
(3) the detection of manipulation or synthesis via pattern
recognition employing machine-learned classifiers. Additional
opportunities include (4) event-certification methods for cer-
tifying that media as captured is linked to actual physical
events, rooted in activities that are certified via a combination
of methods to have occurred at a time and place. With AMP,
we focus on securing media based on the joint use of (1) and
(2), thereby providing the certification of the identity of the
media provider.
The AMP system consists of four main modules including
the AMP Service, the Media Provenance Ledger, the Manifest
Database, and the AMP Authoring Tools. AMP authenticates
media using a digitally signed data structure called a manifest,
and the AMP Service allows content providers to upload their
media manifests to AMP. Manifests are registered in the Media
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2Provenance Ledger, which is a public distributed ledger based
on the Confidential Consortium Framework (CCF) [1], [2].
Manifests can be distributed together with media contents,
whereas the ledger ensures integrity and auditability of the full
history of media publishing operations. In addition, manifests
are indexed by media fragments in a Manifest Database for
fast querying. Once a manifest or group of manifests has been
uploaded, media players can then use the AMP Service to
validate the authenticity of the corresponding media contents,
even if the content is distributed without its manifest. A set of
tools allows content providers to interact with the AMP Service
when the content is published. In addition to the service
and tools, media players (browsers, smartphone applications,
etc.) need to be extended to check and display provenance
information.
Enabling large-scale media provenance will require the
cooperation of multiple participants, including content pro-
ducers, publishers, and technology providers. We envision
AMP supporting a media provenance consortium with open
governance rules, where all the governance operations are
recorded in the Media Provenance Ledger, for auditability and
transparency. We hope that the AMP project will be a starting
point for broadly adopted standards for media provenance
verification.
In this paper we make the following novel contributions:
1) We describe an end-to-end solution for media producers
to provide provenance information for each media item
produced.
2) We describe and benchmark a novel system to track the
provenance of videos uploaded to the Internet.
3) We describe how these videos can be distributed via
CDNs or social media platforms while maintaining
the required provenance information and not requiring
coordination with the CDN providers.
4) We show how the use of novel ledger techniques can
scale-out to handle the majority of media items produced
for distribution on the Internet.
II. AMP SYSTEM OVERVIEW
We provide an overview in this section of the core AMP
concepts and how they are composed to form an end-to-
end media authentication and verification system. Figure 6
illustrates how the AMP components are integrated into a
production, distribution, and rendering pipeline. A content
provider uses the AMP Authoring Tools to create signed
manifests and register them as part of publication, so that
it can be authenticated by the AMP Service. The manifests
can either be created locally by the publisher if they do not
want to upload the media to the backend or alternatively in the
AMP Service itself. Other organizations such as a CDN, social
media platform, or internet service provider (ISP) can similarly
record transformations that they apply to the content provider’s
original media content, using the AMP Authoring Tools. The
AMP Service records the resulting publication metadata in
a manifest, signed by the provider (or the transformer), and
stored in a Manifest Database (DB) for fast verification. One
or more cryptographic hashes of the media content are also
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Fig. 1. High-level overview of the AMP system components (shown in blue).
stored in a verifiable ledger, called the Media Provenance
Ledger, using CCF. Finally, consumer applications such as
browsers, web sites, or media players use AMP manifests
and libraries for verifying (i.e., authenticating) that a media
item indicated as coming from a content provider has been
previously registered in the AMP Service by that provider.
A. AMP System Components
AMP Manifest. The manifest is the central data structure
in AMP. It authenticates media objects (including various
cryptographic hashes of their encodings) and binds them to
their publisher-provided metadata. Manifests support simple
media objects, streaming media, progressive download and
adaptive bitrate streaming. A manifest can also record the
attribution of derived works through “back-pointers” to one
or more source objects, as well as descriptions of how the
original works were transformed.
AMP includes two different sets of modules, one for a near-
term solution and another for a long-term solution. The near-
term modules indicate provenance using a detached manifest
and can work with today’s media formats and infrastructure.
In addition, the long-term solution uses an embedded man-
ifest, which is included in the media stream itself, but it
will ultimately require extensions to both media and browser
standards.
Media Provenance Ledger. Manifests are recorded on a
CCF blockchain. CCF operates the ledger (i.e., blockchain)
of published works, which is essentially a list of manifests,
relying on trusted hardware and providing high availability via
the Raft [3] consensus protocol. Our implementation of CCF
supports the registration of new manifests and issues signed
manifest receipts. These receipts complement the producer’s
signatures; they enable any media consumers to independently
verify that the media they receive has been published with the
corresponding metadata. CCF natively supports online query-
ing and validation of transactions along with their endorsing
certificates.
Manifest Database. Eventually in the long-term solution, we
expect manifests to be distributed with the media objects
3themselves so that their provenance can be verified locally.
To support a gradual transition, and to withstand the distribu-
tion of media without their associated manifests (e.g., media
streamed from YouTube), AMP maintains an indexed manifest
database, so that clients can retrieve manifests given media
excerpts.
AMP Service. The AMP Service exposes the Manifest
Database and the Media Provenance Ledger to client appli-
cation through a set of REST APIs.
AMP Tools and Libraries. We also provide a set of tools and
libraries for interacting with the AMP Service. The tools cover:
(a) the creation, signing, and ingestion of content/manifests
into the AMP system, (b) querying the AMP system for media
authentication information and checking that media objects
are intact, and (c) AMP service governance (adding/removing
members and users, etc.).
Fragile Watermarking. In many cases, the media will be
transformed without registering a manifest that records the
transformation. To facilitate the retrieval of any manifest for
the original media object, the publisher can insert a watermark
using the AMP Watermark Tool. This watermark carries a
unique manifest identifier, which may be used to retrieve the
original contents and metadata, and can be used to compare
them with the transformed media.
User Experience Components. To provide a good user
experience, AMP includes three components including two
variants of a browser extension, two demonstration web pages,
and a modified Chromium browser capable of displaying a new
variant of an HTML video element.
Implementation AMP has been implemented to run on Win-
dows and Linux (Ubuntu LTS 18.04). The Media Provenance
Ledger has been developed and tested on Ubuntu 18.04 since
the CCF framework only currently supports this version of
Linux.
The core AMP components are primarily implemented in
C# using .NET Core 3.1 so that the system will run on Linux,
MacOS and Windows. The browser extension is implemented
in JavaScript and HTML. CCF is primarily written in C++
although it allows applications to be written in either C++ or
Lua. In addition, the audio watermarking code is implemented
in C. This implementation enables efficient porting to many
different processing environments.
III. AMP MANIFESTS
An AMP manifest is a data structure that cryptographically
authenticates media objects and their associated metadata.
Manifests are registered on the Media Provenance Ledger
(Section V), optionally distributed by media providers and dis-
tributors, and recorded in a complementary Manifest Database
(Section VII). The purpose of manifests is to allow media
player clients to quickly and easily verify the publisher (and
possibly the distributor) of a media object. The values stored
in the manifest data structure are generated by the content
provider as it publishes the media object.
AMP supports two types of manifests: static and streaming.
A static manifest handles a simple media object (e.g. JPEG)
or a collection of objects with different encodings (facsimiles),
while a streaming manifest contains an array of cryptographic
hashes corresponding to “chunks” of the associated media. For
example, a chunk might correspond to one or more seconds
of video or audio.
AMP manifests can be used to authenticate the original
source material, or the transformation from one format to an-
other. Note that checking whether a transformation is faithful
is not discussed here.
AMP manifests are signed by publishers, CDNs, etc. The
cryptographic hash of a manifest is called its AMP manifest
ID (ManifestID). It serves as a unique identifier and a commit-
ment for the manifest. ManifestIDs are also digitally signed by
content producers or distributors, and recorded on the ledger.
AMP uses X.509 to create all digital signatures and SHA-256
for all cryptographic hashes.
Static Manifests. A few of the important fields of a static
manifest (and the streaming manifest) are provided in Table I.
A detailed description of the static manifest can be found in
the appendix. The publisher assigns a MediaID to identify a
particular media object. In addition, the MediaID is encoded
into the media object as a watermark and may also be inserted
into the media’s metadata.
The EncodingInformation field contains a string which
indicates the media type (e.g., “JPEG”, “MP4”). This field
helps to guard against the media’s cryptographic hashes being
wrongly interpreted.
AMP manifests can also authenticate media objects that
are derived from other media objects by means of “back
pointers” to one or more source manifests. These “transfor-
mation manifests” can be used by publishers or CDNs to
record transcoding and re-compressions of source material.
Transformation manifests can also be used to record the
original media objects that were edited together to make a
composite derived work.
The value of the OriginManifestID field includes one or
more ManifestIDs that describe the source media used to
create a derived work. If a media object is a simple transcoding
of another media object, this will be a single element array. If
a media object is created from several source objects (e.g., a
news video created from several original media objects) then
additional ManifestIDs can be recorded in the array. Note that
OriginManifestID[] is not authoritative on its own: it should
only be trusted if the ManifestID that describes the transform
is signed by a trusted authority.
The AMP manifest includes a Copyright field which can be
used to provide the copyright string associated with the media
object. This field provides a simple and legally enforceable
way of limiting fake or misleading manifests. Allowed strings
may also be dictated in the AMP terms of service.
In the simplest case (e.g., a picture or a text file), the
manifest contains the cryptographic hash of the image or text
and its associated metadata in the ObjectHash array field.
Optionally, the publisher can create and authenticate more than
one encoding of a media object to optimize for client screen
resolutions or network conditions. We call these alternate
representations facsimiles.
Streaming Manifests. AMP authenticates media objects with
digital signatures. It is straightforward to do this with text
4Field Manifest Type Description
MediaID Static/Streaming Publisher-assigned identifier for the media object.
MasterCopyLocator Static/Streaming URI of a stable, publisher provided location service or a generic URL redirector service.
EncodingInformation Static/Streaming String describing the media type (e.g., “JPEG”, “MP4”).
OriginManifests[] Static/Streaming One or more ManifestIDs that describe the source media used to create a derived work.
Copyright Static/Streaming Copyright string associated with the media object.
ObjectHash[] Static Cryptographic hash of the associated simple media object (or collection of related media
objects).
ChunkDigest Streaming An ordered array of chunk-hashes starting from the beginning of the work.
TABLE I
KEY MANIFEST FIELDS. A MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE MANIFEST STRUCTURES CAN BE FOUND IN THE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL.
and images: we simply generate the cryptographic hash and
then sign picture.jpg or doc.html. Streaming media is more
problematic because (a) an application should not have to wait
to download the entire file before it can check the signature,
(b) streaming services support changing the stream resolution
to match network constraints (adaptive bitrate streaming),
(c) some transport layers are lossy, and (d) users can often
navigate back and forth in streams. These issues imply that
AMP must authenticate much smaller regions (i.e., “chunks”)
in the stream.
All of the fields for the streaming manifest match those
in the static manifest in Table I with the exception of the
final field. While a static manifest contains one or more
cryptographic hashes of an image or text document in the Ob-
jectHash field, a streaming manifest contains a ChunkDigest
which includes an ordered array of chunk-hashes. However,
the details of the streaming manifest in the appendix should
be consulted for more details.
Clients must be able to quickly determine where individual
chunks start and end in order to be able to calculate the
cryptographic hashes of the chunks and compare these against
the entries in an AMP manifest. Unfortunately, different media
formats and network delivery mechanisms require different
chunking strategies.
In one case, the AMP system supports file offset-based
chunking, which works well for HTTP GET-based streaming
(which is most common on today’s internet). Lossy broadcast
streaming requires different chunking strategies, such as I-
frame-to-I-frame chunks for an MPEG stream. Practically,
streaming players process a cryptographic hash of a chunk
every few seconds. In most scenarios, consecutive chunks
delivered to the client will map to consecutive chunk-hashes
in a single manifest. However, if a server is dynamically
switching streams, then more than one manifest may be needed
to authenticate a stream.
AMP also supports adaptive bitrate streaming protocols such
as DASH and HLS. Adaptive bitrate streaming requires several
different encodings of a media object, optimized for different
network conditions and client capabilities. Adaptive bitrate
streams are supported in AMP either by publishing several
manifests authenticating the different encodings, or by using
a single manifest that authenticates multiple facsimiles.
Detached and Embedded Manifests. Initially before en-
coding standards can be modified, manifests will be stored
separately from the media itself, and we call these “detached
manifests”. Long-term, we hope that “embedded manifests”
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Fig. 2. Example Public Key Infrastructure
will be contained within the media’s metadata and be trans-
ported within the media stream itself. We have implemented
two versions of AMP utilizing both detached manifests and
embedded manifests.
IV. PROVENANCE BINDING
Authenticating that media has not been altered since the
manifest was signed demonstrates the media’s integrity, but
tying the signer to an identity known and trusted by the
consumer is what provides provenance, and allows the con-
sumer’s trust in that producer to be imputed to the media.
We have deployed a public key infrastructure (PKI) of X.509
certificates [4] governed and administered by an alliance to
provide a root of trust for establishing identity. The alliance is
then trusted to verify the identity of media producing organiza-
tions and individuals, and issue credentials from its Certificate
Authority (CA) to those organizations and individuals that
can be used to sign manifests and authenticate to the AMP
Service. We expect that this responsibility will be delegated
to Certificate Authorities, who already provide these services
for the authentication of secure web sites. They will perform
due diligence in establishing the identity of media producer
applicants for credentials under contractual obligations to the
alliance. The hierarchical nature of a certificate-based identity
system allows a single parent credential to be issued to the
organization, which can then issue subordinate credentials for
individuals or organizational units. The exact structure of the
subtree of the PKI for a particular organization is beyond the
scope of this design, as it is intended to be customized to the
particular needs and structure of each media producer.
5Initially the root(s) of this PKI will be operated by the
alliance and disconnected from the roots of trust currently used
for the web PKI. Certificates used by participants will be given
Extended Key Usage (EKU) extensions authorizing them for
particular purposes. We have identified five uses and therefore
five EKUs to use in this PKI: 1) server authentication, used
by the AMP Service to authenticate itself to clients, 2) client
authentication, used by clients to authenticate themselves to
the AMP Service, 3) manifest signing, which will be used
by producers to sign manifests, 4) time stamping, which will
be used by the AMP Service and ledgers to attest to the
publication time of a manifest, and 5) ledger registration,
which will be used by ledgers to countersign manifests and
attest they have been registered on that manifest. Server au-
thentication, client authentication, and time stamping already
have standard EKUs defined by the standard, and we will
use those. Manifest signing and ledger registration EKUs
are new purposes for which permanent, unique EKUs have
not yet been allocated. We expect some certificates will be
issued with multiple purposes: for example, the signer of a
manifest will frequently be the client who registers it with the
AMP Service, and so may use the same certificate for both
purposes. Whether or not to combine these purposes in a single
certificate becomes a governance decision for the alliance and
media-producing entities, and the structure of our PKI allows
for both possibilities.
One possible structure for such a PKI is given in Figure 2.
A single root operated by the alliance sits at the top, and
issues intermediate CA credentials to each participating orga-
nization: in this example, the Transnational Press Syndicate
(TPS) and the Western Broadcasting Company (WBC). These
organizations each in turn issue further credentials to units
of their organization: UK and USA bureaus in the case of
TPS, and North and South bureaus in the case of WBC.
Below each of these intermediates are individuals, but they
are enclosed in a dotted-line box because, as described above,
these are optional: An organization may wish to issue signing
credentials to individuals, in which case the organizational unit
credentials are also intermediate CAs. Alternatively, organiza-
tions may wish to maintain centralized publication pipelines,
ingest media from individuals through a mechanism external
to AMP, and sign as part of this process. In this case, the
organizational unit credentials themselves are leaf certificates.
V. MEDIA PROVENANCE LEDGER
AMP implements an instance of CCF [5] to build a ledger-
based application which is designed to securely store a cryp-
tographic hash and copyright string for each manifest. Any
application built with CCF is designed to be administered by a
group of consortium members via CCF’s governance features.
Additionally, AMP utilizes signed receipts as standalone proof
that manifests are registered at a given index in the ledger.
CCF exposes to its users a key-value store. This key-
value store provides a simple abstraction of keys being a
cryptographic hash of a manifest (i.e., ManifestID), with the
value being a signature computed by the publisher over a
concatenation of the ManifestID and the copyright string (i.e.,
Copyright in Table I). Once written, these key-value pairs are
stored in a Merkle tree, and the Merkle tree is replicated and
stored on persistent storage. To ensure that any tampering can
be detected, CCF maintains a private key that the service
protects and occasionally uses it to sign the Merkle root in
the distributed ledger.
One of the core features that AMP utilizes from CCF is its
universally verifiable receipts. The receipt for a given request
validates the query, its response, and, more importantly, it
certifies that its execution was recorded on the ledger. The key
proposition of a receipt is that it is possible to cryptographi-
cally validate that the signature of the manifest’s cryptographic
hash and the copyright string were successfully recorded,
based on just the manifest, the receipt, and the public key
of the CCF service [1] without needing to contact the CCF
service.
Our prototype is designed to be run in a cloud datacenter.
In a real-world implementation we expect and have designed
the service to be run by an operator (such as Azure). CCF’s
utilization of trusted execution environments allows for a
CCF service to be run in a public cloud while maintaining
confidentiality from the cloud provider or operator.
VI. FRAGILE WATERMARKING
We use watermarking to modify the media content in an
imperceptible way. Faint noise-like patterns are inserted within
the media content at production, and they can be read back
at rendering. We tune the watermarking parameters such data
media editing that preserves reasonably high fidelity preserves
the detectability of watermarks, whereas heavier editing such
as partial content replacement or fake media insertions [6],
[7]) will render the watermarking indetectable. Hence the term
fragile watermarking.
We propose the use of fragile watermarking techniques
using a spread-spectrum approach [8], which adds low-level
pseudorandom noise patterns within the media payload, be
it video, audio, or images. The added noise is low enough
(comparable to the small distortions due to the compression
formats) and can be embedded in such a way that makes it
imperceptible to human eyes and ears.
For each type of media and application scenario, we can de-
sign watermarking parameters that influence the thresholds on
allowed changes, so that various kinds of minor modifications
are considered as benign editing. In addition, we use keyless
watermarking for AMP which simplifies system design and
makes watermarking detection open, so it can be performed
by any entity in the media distribution path.
Watermark Payload and Insertion. The watermark payload
string, which is inserted into the media item, is described
in Table II and contains the following fields: a media object
ID (MediaID), a publisher URI (MasterCopyLocator), and a
signature over these two fields (WatermarkPayloadSignature).
AMP does not provide a centralized database containing the
MasterCopyLocator and MediaID. Instead after decoding, the
client extracts the payload and submits the MediaID to the
publisher using via MasterCopyLocator. Both the MediaID
and the MasterCopyLocator are specified by the publisher. The
6Field Description
MediaID Publisher-assigned identifier;
same as in Table I.
MasterCopyLocator Same as in Table I.
Watermark Signature value over the MediaID
Payload and the PublisherID.
Signature
TABLE II
WATERMARK PAYLOAD.
MasterCopyLocator is typically a URI for the publishers Web
service which is used to locate the media by their unique
MediaID. The watermarking insertion process transforms a
media object by embedding a signed watermark before its
publication.
Watermark Decoding. The client inputs a media object to
the Watermark Verification Module in the AMP libraries to
extract the watermark payload fields depicted in Table II.
The Watermark Verification Module uses the MasterCopy-
Locator to obtain a signing certificate. Then, the Watermark
Verification Module uses this signing certificate to check the
WatermarkPayloadSignature over the MediaID and Master-
CopyLocator. If this cryptographic step succeeds, it finally
returns the MediaID and the MasterCopyLocator back to the
client. Once the client has recovered the MasterCopyLocator
and the MediaID, it can then contact the publishers provenance
service to authenticate that the media is valid. Watermark
extraction is keyless: either it fails, or it returns the watermark
payload.
VII. MANIFEST DATABASE
Ideally in the future, all AMP manifests and ledger receipts
will be delivered as additional metadata with the media
objects. Delivering the receipt along with the media allows
the client to quickly validate that the media has been pre-
viously authenticated without contacting the AMP Service.
The widespread use of adding the manifest and receipt to the
metadata will most likely require adoption by one or more
multimedia standards bodies. In the mean time, a client can
use the Manifest Database to map a media object or chunk to
a suitable manifest and receipt.
The AMP Manifest Database contains manifests and re-
ceipts. It is exposed as a public service that lets clients obtain
one or more AMP manifests and receipts that authenticate a
published or transcoded media object. To perform this function
efficiently, the Manifest Database uses the following indexes:
(a) the MediaID delivered via the metadata or a watermark,
and (b) the media ObjectHash or, in the case of streaming
media, the cryptographic hashes of all of the contained chunks
(ChunkDigest).
Media players can quickly and easily extract or calculate
the ObjectHash or a ChunkDigest from the media, and then
use the Manifest Database to find a matching manifest and
the corresponding receipt. To validate the legitimacy of any
manifest that was retrieved from the Manifest Database the
following steps will need to occur:
1) The contents of the manifest will be hashed by a
predetermined cryptographic hash function.
2) The receipt will then be checked to ensure that it
contains the previously calculated hash.
3) The validator will then validate that the receipt is en-
dorsed by media provenance ledger via a signature over
the receipt by the private key of the CCF service.
These steps ensure the validity of the manifest returned by the
Manifest Database by proving it is produced and endorsed by
the media provenance ledger.
The Manifest Database can be centralized or distributed.
Because authoritative truth is stored in the ledger, the security
requirements for the Manifest Database are much less than
for the ledger itself. Note that AMP manifests do not address
problems that arise from more than one publisher signing the
same original content either the same simple object or one
or more ChunkDigests. Similarly, the AMP Service does not
stop a rogue CDN from claiming that one media object is
a faithful transformation of an original when in fact it has
been maliciously authored. We believe that these issues can
be addressed by a combination of client policies (e.g., only
consider the oldest manifest of a media object) and server-
side terms-of-service.
Transformation Services. A Transformation Service takes
one or more media objects and creates a derived object. A
CDN is a simple example: CDNs can take a single media
object and re-encodes it into several derived objects with
different compression parameters to optimize for bandwidth
and network losses. AMP manifests support transformation
services by allowing entities to indicate the ManifestID of one
or more source objects that were used to create the derived
object.
Note that a transformation manifest does not in itself
guarantee that a derived object is indeed a high-fidelity trans-
formation of a source object. It is entirely possible that the
“purportedly derived” object is unrelated to the stated original.
Trust assessments should involve the entity that signed the
transformation manifest. In the simple case, this might be
the original publisher. For example, a media publisher creates
a master media object and a dozen copies with different
compression factors. A more complex example might be a
CDN acting on behalf of the media publisher.
Policies can be developed for transitive trust that work for
common scenarios. These policies can be enforced with a
combination of client- and server-side rules, as well as server-
side terms-of-service. Other entities might create and sign
transformation manifests. For example, a third-party service
might use heuristics to compare the semantic content of two
videos and create and sign transformation manifests for the
videos that they determine are semantically identical. Once
more, AMP makes no trust assumptions: it is up to clients
to use trust policies that are appropriate for a given scenario.
In the case of streaming manifests, there is no requirement
that source-chunks map 1:1 to transformed chunks: chunks
are “natural” for each stream.
Manifest Revocation. As noted previously, CCF’s ledger is
immutable; once a manifest is stored on the CCF ledger,
it cannot be removed. Therefore when a publisher wants to
revoke a manifest from the ledger, it must insert a revocation
7object to the ledger. To enable efficient queries, the Manifest
Database deletes this manifest in this case.
VIII. USER EXPERIENCE
User experience is a critical part of the AMP system.
AMP provides three separate types components to facilitate
a good user experience including a modified browser, browser
extensions and example web sites.
A. Modified Chromium Browser
For media with the embedded manifest, we first created a
modified Edge Chromium browser which included a modified
video element. This modification was done to evaluate the
embedded manifest included in a modified video stream.
B. Provenance Browser Extensions
AMP includes separate browser extensions for displaying
media using detached manifests and embedded manifests. The
goal of the detached manifest is to allow for the authentication
of the media without any modifications to the standardized me-
dia and browser as well as the media transport infrastructure.
To do so, we have created a browser extension that works on
both the Chrome and latest Edge Chromium browsers.
To support media authentication, the AMP detached man-
ifest browser extension monitors the web traffic using the
webRequest API for a particular site. Typically, a particular
media player embedded in either a browser or an application
streams the media for playback or rendering using HTTP
partial-GETs. This process fetches data from the media server
based on different protocols which may vary depending upon
network quality conditions. Since AMP’s detached manifest
requires hashes to be computed on fixed chunk sizes so that
the hashes of the received media matches those in the manifest,
AMP’s browser extension must stream of second copy of the
data. For demonstration purposes, we have implemented the
browser extension to authenticate any video on YouTube after
a manifest for that video has been uploaded to the AMP
Service. An example of this browser extension is shown in
the Figure 3 for the case of a video which has been registered
in the manifest. For this authenticated video, the browser
extension displays a green check mark indicating that the
video’s manifest has indeed been located in the Manifest
Database. If the video cannot be authenticated, the browser
extension icon is blank. If a video can be authenticated, then
clicking on the browser extension icon does display the core
manifest information associated with its publication.
The browser extension for the embedded manifest has a
similar user interface. However, the detection mechanism is
much simpler than for the detached manifest because the
browser signal is generated by the new video element in the
modified Edge Chromium browser.
C. Example Web Sites
While browser extensions are able to convey whether a
single video which is being played has been authenticated,
it has difficulties conveying to a user if two or more video
Fig. 3. Browser extension which supports a detached manifest. The green
check mark in the upper right indicates that the video has been authenticated.
Clicking on the browser extension icon causes the core manifest information
to be displayed in the popup window.
Fig. 4. Example of a synthetic social media that can be used to display
fine-grained provenance signals.
can authenticated while being played simultaneously. Another
challenge is that it may be difficult for the user to understand
which video on a web page containing multiple videos is being
authenticated. In this case, it may be useful for the web page
developer to embed the provenance signal directly into the
web page. To this end, we have developed two demonstration
web sites to display AMP’s authentication information in a
fine-grained setting. The first is a synthetic social media web
site shown in Figure 4, and the second is an example news
site that is depicted in Figure 5.
IX. TOOLS AND GOVERNANCE
There are two parts to the authoring and management back-
end. The first part supports the publishing flow. We have
developed tools that create a signed manifest (AMP Manifest
Creation Tool, AMP Signing Tool), watermark the media
(AMP Watermark Tool) and record the manifest on a ledger
(AMP Ledger Insertion Tool). The AMP Client Provenance
Library can be used by the client application to chunk a video
and compute the cryptographic hashes of these chunks. These
tools and tool-chains can be used by an ISP, CDN, or another
media editing tool to support “authenticated transformations”
8Fig. 5. Demonstration news web site for displaying AMP’s provenance
signals.
 
Fig. 6. Integration of AMP tools and services into a media production and
distribution pipeline.
of an original work, as well as tools that allow authentication
information to be added to legacy media (e.g., videos already
hosted on YouTube).
The second part of the authoring back-end relates to gov-
ernance. We use the Microsoft CCF (Confidential Consortium
Framework) technology to maintain a ledger of published
works and provide a governance model over it. CCF provides
a flexible governance model, allowing for a group of members
to vote on everything from adding and removing users to
updating the CCF service code. If AMP is adopted to provide
media provenance, we will collaborate with our media partners
at that time to create a governance model. When additional
partners join the partnership, we will use CCF to evolve the
governance rules as required.
X. EXAMPLE MEDIA PUBLISHING FLOW
The purpose and operation of the various AMP components
is demonstrated by tracing a typical flow of media through
the system. A typical flow is depicted in Figure 6. The
media publishing flow consists of two phases: publishing
and playback. We present below how various AMP Service
components can be used during the publishing and playback
phases.
Publishing
Assume a content producer generates two media objects:
picture.jpg, and video.mp4. The publisher:
1) Uses ffmpeg to convert video.mp4 into a set of re-
compressions, video[n].mp4, at various quality levels
(e.g., using DASH).
2) Generates a collection of unique ObjectIDs for the
objects to be authenticated.
3) Uses the AMP Watermarking Tool to insert encoded
versions of the ObjectIDs, their PublisherID and the
WatermarkPayloadSignature into the watermark payload
of the picture.jpg and all videos that are to be published.
4) Uses the AMP Manifest Creation Tool to create a
manifest for the media objects.
5) Uses the AMP Signing Tool to signing the manifest with
its publisher’s key.
6) Registers the manifest’s cryptographic hash and copy-
right string with the Media Provenance Ledger using
the AMP Ledger Insertion Tool.
7) Uploads the manifests to the AMP Manifest Database
using the AMP Ledger Insertion Tool.
8) Broadcasts (i.e., stages on a web site, etc.) picture.jpg
and video[n].mp4.
Optional step for CDNs, ISPs, etc:
1) CDNs take video[n].mp4 and picture.jpg and create
further derived copies using steps 4 through 8 except that
these manifests refer back to the original AMP manifest.
Playback
A client application (e.g., browser, media player, etc.):
1) Links to the AMP Client Provenance Library or imple-
ments the functionality itself to cryptographically hash
a video object’s “chunks” or simple media object (e.g.,
JPEG, text).
2) Consults the AMP Service to obtain a suitable manifest
or manifests.
3) Verifies the publisher’s signature and the receipt gen-
erated by CCF to ensure that the manifest is valid.
Successful verification ensures the authenticity of the
media.
4) Displays the authentication information (simple or more
complex information) if the media is authenticated.
5) Searches for a watermark in the media If a valid manifest
is not found in the Manifest Database. Next, attempts to
validate the media object based on the PublishedID and
ObjectID if the WatermarkPayloadSignature is valid.
XI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Media Provenance Ledger. We begin by measuring the time
required to insert a manifest’s relevant data into the Media
Provenance Ledger. In this test, we insert strings, which
consist of an example 256-bit cryptographic hash of a manifest
(ManifestID) and a copyright string, into the ledger. These
data structures do not need to be addressable in CCF since
the fact that they are recorded in the ledger is sufficient. To
9this end, we measure the maximum sustainable rate at which
a manifest’s data can be submitted.
Application. We built a C++ application that customizes the
CCF framework to produce a Media Provenance Ledger. The
ledger application is small and can be expressed in several
hundred lines of C++ code. The following is an example of
the data that the ledger application stores:
{"method": "LOG\_record",
"params’’: {"id": 0, "msg":
"88c3ba2b25cef698d9ca6775b7fd5c5e
8bbc246098a55ad51b8078834c4add44
Copyright (c) CompanyName Corporation.
All rights reserved."}
}
Experimental Setup. We ran the performance application in
three cluster configurations:
1) Single Azure Region - Each computer is an Intel(R)
Xeon(R) E-2176G CPU @ 3.70GHz, and the application
runs inside a 4 core virtual machine.
2) 2 Geographically distributed Azure Regions - Each com-
puter is an Intel(R) Xeon(R) E-2176G CPU @ 3.70GHz,
and the application runs inside a 4 core virtual machine.
The computers are every distributed between the east
USA and west Europe Azure regions.
3) Emerging hardware - A cluster that is running in our
own datacenter. All computers are under the same 40G
switch, and the computers is an Intel(R) Xeon(R) E-
2288G CPU @ 3.70GHz which has 8 cores.
All of these VMs are running Ubuntu 18.04, and the results
are shown in Table III. We expect that there will be up to 1
billion entries added to the ledger every day, this results in
an expected load of 11,575 operations per second. We can
conclude from these results that our implementation of the
Media Provenance Ledger can comfortably handle this load.
Even with just a few nodes, we can achieve latencies that are
low enough to not interfere with the user’s experience in media
consumption.
AMP Service. Next, we estimate the maximum scale re-
quirements for the AMP Service assuming the following
parameters:
• 10,000 publishers
• Every publisher uploads 100, 10-minute original video
clips uploaded each day
• The video is divided into 10 second chunks (10 mins is
60 chunks) and each chunk is cryptographically hashed
• Each original video is transformed into 99 (100-1) vari-
ants by the CDN
Using these parameters, this translates into
• 370 million original videos/year
• 37 billion original and transformed videos/year
• 22 billion original chunks/year
• 2.2 trillion total chunks/year
Since the AMP Service is independent of the CCF nodes,
we can use large-scale VMs for implementing the index. If the
index is a 32-byte cryptographic hash and 32 bytes of other
data (manifest Copyright field), the total index size for all
Configuration 1 Throughput (tx/s) Avg. latency (ms)
nodes
1 34,316 105
3 31,828 154
5 30,763 159
7 30,013 164
Configuration 2 Throughput (tx/s) Avg. latency (ms)
nodes
1 34,316 105
3 32,415 244
5 31,617 245
7 30,500 248
Configuration 3 Throughput (tx/s) Avg. latency (ms)
nodes
1 57,433 80
3 52,798 131
5 52,308 132
7 49,237 140
TABLE III
MEDIA PROVENANCE LEDGER THROUGHPUT AND LATENCY.
YouTube ID ODG Mean ODG Std
XFmn9kmZAWU -0.74 0.0066
xn 8UQ1W6 c -1.51 0.0043
bF nULoyi9o -0.99 0.0039
iuX826AGXWU -1.26 0.0026
TABLE IV
OBJECTIVE DIFFERENCE GRADE SCORES FOR AUDIO WATERMARKING OF
FOUR DIFFERENT YOUTUBE VIDEOS.
known chunks is 1.4 TBytes. Azure offers VMs with enough
memory and disk to hold the index in a single instance, and
therefore the index will not require sharding.
If the AMP Service exceeds these estimates, we can shard
the index. Scaling through sharding is easy: the indices are
cryptographic hashes so they will be uniformly distributed.
Therefore, we believe that it will be practical to have the
Manifest Database indexed on chunk-hashes.
Audio Watermarking. AMP’s audio watermarking module
inserts a watermark into the frequency domain coefficients
of the audio signal. It is important to measure the distortion
introduced by the watermark, as we want it to be imper-
ceptible. Table IV measures the Objective Difference Grade
(ODG) [9] for the audio channel of four different YouTube
videos. The ODG ranges from 0 (no distortion) to -4 (high
perceptual distortion). The mean and standard deviation are
computed for five different trials with 1000 random bits of
information inserted using 512 chips per information bit.
Preliminary experiments show that watermarking generates no
audible distortions.
XII. AMP PARTNERSHIP AND STANDARDS
We believe that the proposed AMP media provenance
certification and verification system can only be successful if
it becomes a widely adopted industry standard. Thus, we are
forming a partnership with media organizations and additional
technology providers. We plan to put this collaboration on a
formal footing through the formation of an industry alliance
similar to the Alliance for Open Media. Other companies can
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join, either as active contributors or supporters. Such a model
can move quickly for ratification of a more detailed design,
with the goal of developing reference code and performing
sufficient testing to assess the efficiency and performance of
the proposed provenance certification and verification system.
A key goal of such an effort should be to promote the
development of an open standard, to motivate fast adoption.
We believe that the implementation of a reliable provenance
certification and verification system can be a significant step
in increasing trust in media. It will also benefit the business
models of all bona fide entities involved in the creation and
distribution of media.
XIII. DISCUSSIONS
It will take a number of years before manifests for a large
percentage of online media are stored in AMP. We believe
this content gap and inability to report on the authenticity of
media will be biggest issue with adoption. We expect that
this can be solved in the user-interface such that users are
only informed when there is valuable information to provide
to them. At the point when most media that is consumed does
have authentication it would become prudent to report that
authentication for some media is missing. Another direction
for future work is understanding how provenance information
should best be conveyed to the user as another heuristic for
evaluating content credibility [10], [11].
One area that AMP does not address is the detection of fake
media. We believe that the quality of fake media will rapidly
improve and become more widely encountered. Additional
fake media detection algorithms will need to be incorporated
into the media processing pipeline in the near future. A number
of academic and industry efforts are currently underway to
improve the detection of deep fakes. We see this work as
orthogonal to the provenance solution proposed by AMP, and
these detection methods can also be included in the future as
part of the AMP service.
We have designed AMP to authenticate that a media item
was published by a known source. AMP is not a digital
rights management (DRM) system that is designed to enforce
copyright of the media content providers. Media provenance
and AMP are about verifying the producing entity, not ver-
ifying/tracking/authorizing the consuming entity. While it is
possible to use AMP in this way, functionality such as self-
verifiable receipts would work against this, and this is a
property we do not intend to change.
XIV. RELATED WORK
Previous related research to the AMP system and effort span
three main areas: previously proposed provenance systems,
other provenance partnerships, and deep fake detection and
content generation.
Provenance Systems. Provenance systems for the prevention
of deep fakes is a new and relatively understudied area. The
provenance-based system that is most closely related to AMP
was recently proposed by Hasan [12]. Like AMP, this system
also employs blockchain. However, it is based on the Ethereum
blockchain and smart contracts. Since AMP utilizes CCF, it
is much more efficient, allowing the speedup of manifest
insertion and queries by several orders of magnitude which
is required for widespread deployment.
In addition to [12], several startups have proposed
provenance-based systems including: Amber and Witness.
Amber’s technology [13], [14] is aimed at camera manufac-
turers and adds a cryptographic hash to the video at a user
specified rate. Similar to AMP, these hashes are then stored
on an Ethereum blockchain.
Similarly, Truepic [15] also provides a photo and verifica-
tion service where the cryptographic signature is written to a
blockchain.
Provenance Partnerships. Several other partnerships have
been created to ensure the provenance of media. The New
York Times Company is working with IBM on The News
Provenance Project [16]. This collaboration is also using a
blockchain to provide a provenance solution for media.
The Content Authenticity Initiative is a second partnership
with Adobe, The New York Times Company and Twitter [17].
Witness is a non-governmental organization which aims to
help ensure that human rights abuses can be documented in a
verifiable manner. Witness published the ProofMode Android
application [18] in 2017 which stores metadata about images
and videos taken by those seeking to provide evidence of
human rights abuses. The app includes a hash of the media and
its metadata along with a cryptographic signature that helps
to ensure the chain of custody.
Deep Fake Detection. Deep fake detection is an alternate
method to provenance solutions and rely on the algorithmic
detection of synthetically generated media. A number of deep
fake detection algorithms have been proposed in the literature.
In [19], Li et al. describe their realization that deep fake
videos which had been created prior the paper’s publication
in 2018 often had eyes which failed to blink, which is natural
for humans. Thus, they created an eye blink detector and used
it as a proxy to detect deep fake videos.
McCloskey and Albright [20] noted that generative adver-
sarial networks (GANs) fail to accurately reproduce colors that
are captured naturally by photosensitive cells in a camera’s
sensor. Their approach to detecting deep fakes is to train a
convolutional neural network (CNN) to detect this mismatch
in the color.
Face warping artifacts can be introduced during the gen-
eration of deep fake videos. Li and Lyu trained a CNN to
detect these artifacts to detect some types of deep fake attacks
in [21]. Similarly, Yang et al. [22] also trained a CNN to detect
inconsistencies in head poses.
In [23], Korshunov and Marcel explore trying to jointly
use the audio and video, but their experiments indicated that
adding the audio did not help.
In the FaceForensics++ system proposed by Ro¨ssler et
al. [24], the Xception computer vision object recognition
model which also employs CNNs were also used to various
types of deep fakes. A leader board of deep fake detection
algorithms on the FaceForensics++ dataset can be found
at [25].
Content Generation. Generative adversarial networks were
originally proposed by Goodfellow, et al. [26]. Several impor-
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tant works [27], [28] have investigated using GANs for large-
scale, synthetic image generation. Recent research in GANs
has enabled talking head models to be quickly adapted with
just a few frames [29].
Popular face swap algorithms include Deepfakes [6] and
FaceSwap [7]. Facial expressions can be transferred from one
person to a person in a video in real-time using the Face2Face
algorithm [30].
XV. CONCLUSION
Synthesized and fake media has become a threat to individu-
als and private and public institutions. The threat has increased
because of rapid advances in methods for synthesizing media,
coupled with the wide reach of the Web. Fake media has
the potential to significantly undermine trust in media and
journalism, threatening the foundations of democracy. We
believe that algorithms for fake media detection will have
limited success in the long term, so we propose the use
of provenance certification and authentication, as that is a
fundamental step in increasing trust.
We have proposed, designed, and built a prototype of the
AMP system. AMP allows trusted content providers to form
one or more consortiums that allow applications such as a
media player or a browser to provide an indication to users that
the source of the content they are viewing has been verified.
Beyond the core security pipeline, human factors and design
will play an important role on the success of AMP. Inspired
by the TLS lock icon, we propose that applications such as
browsers and media players include UI elements to alert users
that the received content can be traced back to its original
source.
For a provenance solution such as AMP to be successful, it
must be formally adopted by a recognized standards body. We
are seeking the development of such standards for the AMP
system or a variant that provides similar functionality. We
also believe that it is important to open source the code for a
widely used provenance system. Thus, we plan to open source
the AMP system in near future to facilitate its widespread
adoption.
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APPENDIX A
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this appendix is to provide additional details
about the AMP system design which are not covered in the
submitted paper. In particular, Section B includes an extended
description of the different types of manifests, and Section C
describes AMP’s structures in detail. Finally, CCF is used to
p ovide additional functionality which is described in D.
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Fig. 7. A simplified illustration of a ManifestCore and related data structures.
Many fields and some data structures are omitted for clarity.
APPENDIX B
MANIFEST DETAILS
This section provides additional details about the full man-
ifest which is depicted in Figure 7. A manifest is actually
a container (ManifestContainer) and includes a core manifest
called the ManifestCore, a FacssimileInformation to describe
facsimiles of the original media object, and two structures
which provide supporting evidence of the publisher (Pub-
lisherAttestation) and the ledger (LedgerAttestation). Before
describing the manifest details, we next provide an overview
of how to use a manifest.
A. Using Manifests
Manifests can be created by publishers, re-distributors
(CDNs, ISPs), social media platforms, recording devices, etc.
and manifests are signed by the entity that created them.
Manifests can also be countersigned by cloud services: for
example, the CCF cloud service produces a signed receipt
to acknowledge that a Media Manifest has been recorded
on a ledger. Manifests are conventionally JSON or CBOR
encoded; the canonicalization rules are described later in this
specification. If the canonicalization rules are followed, then
manifests can be translated back and forth from JSON to
CBOR as needed. For ease of development, the manifest
authoring tools sign both the CBOR representation (using
a COSE signature) and the JSON representation (using a
JWT signature). The ManifestID is the hash of the CBOR-
encoded manifest. Manifests can be delivered to clients as
metadata with the actual media objects. However, since the
ecosystem for delivering media is complex, we expect that it
will take time for this delivery infrastructure to be widespread.
Considering this, AMP provides a Manifest Database that
clients can use to search for a manifest for a work. There
are several ways to query the Manifest Database, including
querying by ManifestID, querying by the hash of the entire
work, or an array of hashes of chunks of the work.
B. Authenticating Works
Each manifest authenticates either precisely one work, or
several facsimiles of a work. There are no technical restrictions
on what constitutes a facsimile, but the intention is that
facsimiles support the very common scenario in which web
sites, CDNs, etc. prepare a family of media objects (images,
video, audio) that are optimized for different devices and
network conditions, but all of which represent the same content
just not the same exact bits.
Manifests broadly contain two classes of data:
Metadata: This is publisher-assigned data, such as a publisher
name and a title for the work.
Media bindings: This describes the facsimiles: for example,
cryptographic digests of the media, or subsets/chunks of the
media and media type information.
These fields are described in more detail in the following
sections.
C. Metadata
Most metadata is contained in the structures PublisherInfo
and WorkInfo, with the option to include facsimile-specific
information in the FacsimileDescriptor structure. This spec-
ification intentionally limits the metadata that is defined in
this structure, and still less is mandatory. A minimal set of
metadata would be the name of the publisher and the name
of the work. If additional metadata needs to be attached, then
it can be expressed in the OtherClaims data structures. The
manifest supports an array of OtherClaims structures to be
included in PublisherInfo (claims about the publisher), Work-
Info (claims about the work), FacsimileDescriptor (claims
about the facsimile), and SourceWork (describing the how
a source work was transformed to produce a derived work).
OtherClaims allows two sorts of claims to be associated with
the manifest. Claim-sets can be embedded directly into the
manifest, or a URI (or other descriptor) can be used to
associate claims outside the manifest. In the case of external
claims, OtherData allows the option that the manifest can
cryptographically commit to the external claims by including
the hash of the external data in the OtherClaims structure.
OtherClaims contains a string type descriptor. We expect to
define a few standard descriptors such as “XMP,” “EIDR”,
“SCHEMA,” and then use a DNS-style namespace to allow
extensions. For example, the current manifest tools use the
type descriptor “;com.microsoft.amp.youtube-info”; to encode
YouTube metadata.
D. Media Bindings
1) Authentication using an Object Digest: All facsimiles
are authenticated by hashing the entirety of the data that
constitutes the facsimile: e.g., the hash of the entire PDF,
JPG, MP4, OGV, etc. file. Some commonly used multimedia
standards allow multiple streams to be packaged in a single
object. In some cases, it still makes sense to authenticate the
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entire container file or stream. In other cases, a subset of the
underlying media file is authenticated. One important example
of this is when the manifest is packaged in the media file
itself for example, when the manifest is embedded in an
ISO/MPEG container. In all cases, the manifest directly or
indirectly specifies exactly what parts of the media object are
hashed.
2) Authentication using Chunking: Most modern media
players download and buffer a few seconds of media and then
start playing almost immediately, so authenticating a media
object based on the hash of the whole file is inappropri-
ate. To support progressive/streaming playback of media, the
system supports streaming authentication using a collection
of the hashes of “chunks” of the media object. Different
media delivery schemes demand different chunking schemes.
Two chunking schemes are currently supported: file-offset-
based chunking, and a Merkle-tree based scheme for MP4-
containerized video. Each Facsimile can be authenticated using
more than one chunking scheme to allow a single work to be
delivered in multiple ways.
3) File-Offset-Based Chunking: The most common me-
dia rendering technology on the web today is the HTML5
<video> element. The simplest way of using an HTML5
video player is to configure the <video> element to fetch
video data from a URL. In this case, the <video> element
performs a sequence of HTTP partial-GET operations to fetch
the video data. File-offset-based chunking can be used to do
progressive authentication in this case: the manifest contains
an array of hashes of (say) 256KB chunks of the underlying
video file, and the video player or browser calculates video-
stream hashes and checks that they match a manifest. File-
offset-based hashing can also work with Adaptive Bitrate
(ABR) Streaming in some circumstances. ABR on the web
is enabled by video player logic (often a JavaScript library
running in the web page) fetching audio and video data from
a collection of files encoded at different bandwidths. File-
offset-based chunking still works in this case: each of the
underlying video files is chunked, hashed, and encoded in
the manifest. The SimpleChunkList data structure is used to
encoded file-offset-based chunking. SimpleChunkLists contain
an array of hashes and the size of the underlying chunks. The
size of each chunk is recorded in the manifest, but we will
additionally define some standard lengths to enable chunk-
hashes to be calculated by clients when they do not yet have
a valid manifest. The final chunk in a file may be less than
the chunk size.
4) MP4-Container Hashing and Merkle Tree Authentica-
tion: The MP4 ISO/IEC container format is a widely used
standard for encoding any sort of media object in a file
or stream. MP4 defines “box” types for holding multimedia
data and metadata. For the purposes of this discussion, the
following box types are important:
• MOOV: Basic stream metadata: one per container
• MDAT: Video or audio data: typically, a few seconds
• MOOF: Describes the samples in the subsequent MDAT
The simplest fragmented MP4 container contains {MOOV
[MOOF, MDAT] +}, but most containers have additional
boxes. MP4-Container-chunking defines a chunk as a subset
of the MOOF data that defines the sample, together with the
corresponding video data: i.e., the MDAT.
Chunk hashes defined in this way can be embedded in a
ManifestCore using the MerkleTreeAuthenticator, described
next.
5) Merkle Tree Authentication: Typical chunk sizes for
fragmented MP4 are a few seconds long, so the chunk hash
data can be quite large. If the authentication data is encoded
as a simple array, then the array of chunk hashes must be
available in its entirety before authentication can begin. The
MerkleTreeAuthenticator is an alternative representation of the
chunk-hashes that allows authentication to begin when only a
subset of the authentication data is available. This is achieved
by encoding part of the authentication data in the manifest,
and additional “evidence” in the media stream itself. Together,
these allow a player to check that a media chunk is consistent
with a manifest. This form of authentication is supported by
encoding the authentication data as a Merkle hash tree. A
Merkle Tree, depicted in Figure 8, is a binary tree of hashes,
where the leaves of the tree are the digests of the [MOOF
MDAT] samples, and each row in the tree is the hash of the
data or hashes in the row beneath.
The Merkle Tree authenticator is encoded in two parts,
which are typically distributed separately. The actual Media
Manifest contains one row of hashes from the tree: for
example, the D2,0 and D2,1 digests in the figure above. This
would be sufficient to the authenticate the video data as long
as the player can read and hash all of the data leading up to
D2,0 or D2,1, but (in this example) the player would have
to read, chunk, and hash half of the file before authentication
could begin. To avoid the need for excessive read-ahead, the
media can be distributed with the relevant missing parts of
the tree, so that the player can validate that a particular chunk
hash is consistent with the manifest. For example, in the figure
above, to prove that the first sample is consistent with D 2,0 the
evidence would be D0,1 and D1,2 because these hash values
can be used to form the missing parts of the tree.
The tree is formed as follows. The depth of the tree is
determined by the number of chunks in the file. In general, the
number of leaf hashes is not a power of two. In such cases,
the tree depth is calculated by rounding up the number of leaf
hashes to the next power of two. For example, if there are 5
chunks, then this rounds up to 8, which leads to a tree depth
of 4, including the leaves of the tree. The general rules for
forming the tree (in both the power-of-two, and non-power of
two case) are as follows:
1) The leaf hashes are formed from the hash of the chunk
data.
2) The “hash” of non-present chunk is termed null.
To form intermediate node hashes in the tree:
1) If both inputs are non-null, then output = Hash
(LHS—RHS)
2) If one input (RHS) is null, thenoutput = LHS
3) If both inputs are null, thenoutput = null
The MerkleTreeAuthenticator data structure encodes one row
of the hash tree in the Media Manifest, omitting null values.
Encoding of the evidence hashes is described in the next
section.
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Fig. 8. Merkle Hash Tree formed over multimedia data. The “leaves” of the hash tree are the hashes of the media samples, and each row in the hash tree is
formed from the hash of the concatenation of the two hashes in the lower layer. The top-hash is called the root of the hash tree. If the number of samples is
not a power of two, the leaves of the “missing” samples at the end of the file are null, and are processed according to the rules in this section.
Encoding Evidence in an MP4 Container. The evidence that
allows a player to determine that a chunk is consistent with
an associated manifest is encoded in an ISO/MP4 UUID-box
called a ChunkIntegrityBox. The ChunkIntegrityBox enables
verification of a set of samples when combined with the
manifest.
Box Type: ‘uuid’
% (Big-Endian Bytes)
Box Extended Type:469d22dfe1924defa71ef4c9f2ce3e71
Container: Movie Fragment Box (‘traf’)
Mandatory:No
Quantity:Zero or one
Syntax
class ChunkIntegrityBox extends
FullBox(‘uuid’, 469d22dfe1924defa71ef4c9f2ce3e71,
version=0, flags=0)
{
unsigned int(8) hash tree id;
unsigned int(16)hash location;
unsigned int(8)hash size;
unsigned int(8)hash count;
{
unsigned int(8)[hash size] hash;
}[hash count]
}
The ChunkIntegrityBox fields are as follows:
• hash tree id: The index into the list of hashed streams
in the manifest
• hash location: The zero-based chunk index
• hash size: The size, in bytes, of the hash value
• hash[] Every non-null hash from the tree required to get
from this chunks node to one of the nodes found in the
manifest. These hashes are sequenced from leaf to root.
E. Adaptive Bitrate Streaming
The MPEG-DASH and Microsoft Smooth Streaming are
adaptive bitrate (ABR) streaming formats that allow a client
player to select between different encodings of the same
video object. Stream selection can happen when playing starts
but, if network conditions change, can also happen during
playback. Under the covers, these streaming standards are
usually enabled by creating a set of underlying compressed
media files and dynamically assembling them into HLS or
DASH objects with CMAF (MP4) chunks. The individual files
are encoded using different bandwidths/compression ratios,
and, for each bandwidth, the original video is usually split into
shorter files to allow client players to switch bandwidths every
few seconds by fetching from a different source file. Adaptive
streaming is supported by a set of ManifestCore strucures by
treating each of the separately encoded constituent files as
a Facsimile. In some cases, this might be a Transformation
Manifest with a back-pointer to the manifest for an original
high-definition file that was used to create the ABR streams,
and in other cases the ABR streams will all be authenticated
using a simple (non-transformation) manifest.
F. Transformation Manifests
Transformation Manifests are used to authenticate Works
that are transformed from other Works. Transformation Man-
ifests can be authored by the same publisher that created
the original work, can be authored by an entity operating on
behalf of another entity (e.g. a CDN), or can be created by a
completely unrelated entity, tool, or person.1 Such manifests
allow an entity to apply a transformation to a work, establish
the original work as its source, and make a signed claim this
transformation does not alter the meaning of the content of the
original Work. The manifest does not itself prove this assertion
automatically but provides an auditable trail through which the
assertion could be challenged. How such a challenge would be
1Trust assessments when several parties are involved are not discussed here.
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resolved is beyond the scope of this work; the manifest only
ensures the transforming entity is accountable for transformed
Works it releases.
Transformation Manifests differ from original work mani-
fests in that they specify the ManifestID of the source work
or works used to create the derived work, and also include
the nature of the transformation applied. The primary initial
scenario enabled by Transformation Manifests is re-encoding
of a media object after the original manifest is created. How-
ever, we have allowed for future extensibility to express more
complex sorts of derivation such as editing and media object
composition. Such an extension of Transformation Manifests
may allow for the meaning of the original work to be altered,
but in a specific and documented way they assert is acceptable
and does not alter the meaning of the transformed content. For
example, a derivative work in the form of a news report might
use a clip of a newsworthy event, and the producing entity
could both assert the originality of its own content and make a
claim that the clip of the event being described is unaltered, or
itself transformed in some acceptable way, such as transcoded,
or decorated with the entity’s chyron or watermark.
G. Distributing Manifests and Manifest Containers
A simplified representation of a ManifestCore and related
data structures in illustrated in Figure 7. The central data
structure that cryptographically authenticates media is called
the ManifestCore. A ManifestCore directly contains some
data items, and cryptographic commitment to external data
structures that may be distributed with the manifest or by
other means. The ManifestCore uses commitments/hashes
rather than embedding the data structure directly when the
supplemental data is not always required. For example:
• The facsimile media authentication information is en-
coded in one or more external FacsimileDescriptors. This
allows a media object to be distributed with only the
FacsimileDescriptors that are relevant. For example, if a
video object is encoded in WEBM and MP4, and each is
encoded in 5 different bit rates and resolutions, this is 10
facsimiles. If a player is just playing one of these streams,
then only the appropriate FacsimileDescriptor needs to be
available to authenticate the stream.
• There are a wide range of media metadata formats, and
there is a wide range of data that a publisher might want
to associate with a work; some of which the publisher
might not want to distribute. Commitment can be used to
attach supplemental metadata to a manifest.
The consequence of this is that a ManifestCore always needs
additional data structures before it can be used to authenticate
media. The ManifestContainer data structure is an envelope
that allows a ManifestCore to be distributed with supplemental
data structures that allow a work to be authenticated. Note
that the ManifestCore cannot be modified after it is created
because the MediaID would change and signatures would
break. However, ManifestContainers (each of which contains
a ManifestCore) can be freely created with just the data
needed for the intended purpose. ManifestContainers can also
contain signature blocks and certificates from the publisher
(PublisherAttestation and LedgerAttestation).
H. Signing Manifests
Manifests are typically signed by the originator (publisher,
redistributor, social media platform, etc.) and may be counter-
signed by distributed ledger services. Manifest signatures are
performed over the hash of a canonical representation of
the manifest. JSON and CBOR representations are used by
different parts of the system, so the manifest is signed twice:
once to produce a JWT signature block (JSON) and once to
produce a COSE signature block (CBOR). A PublisherAttesta-
tion optionally allows the signer certificate or certificate chain
to be bundled in the ManifestContainer.
I. Canonicalization
ManifestIDs and signatures are over JSON or CBOR canon-
ical encodings. JSON canonicalization follows the IEFT JCS
draft. CBOR canonicalization follows RFC7049. COSE sig-
natures follow RFC8152.
APPENDIX C
MANIFEST STRUCTURES
This section includes the detailed definitions for some of
the key AMP manifest structures.
A. ManifestContainer
A ManifestContainer (Table V) is a holder for information
needed to authenticate a media object.
The ManifestContainer structure contains all the informa-
tion necessary to validate a work. ManifestCore is the central
structure: it is usually hashed and signed, in which case
publisher signing information is held in PublisherAttestation.
If the manifest is registered on a public ledger/blockchain then
additional evidence from the service provider can be stored in
LedgerAttestation.
The actual multimedia data is hashed to allow it to be
authenticated during playback or forensic analysis. The media
hashes are not stored directly in the ManifestCore, but instead
are stored in FacsimileDescriptor structures inside Facsimile-
Info, with one FacsimileDescriptor structure per facsimile. The
FacsimileDescriptors are cryptographically bound to the man-
ifest by hashing. Keeping the FacsimileDescriptors separate
allows ManifestContainers to be smaller in the case where
a manifest is expected to be used with just one or a few
facsimiles.
B. ManifestCore
A ManifestCore (Table VI) cryptographically authenticates
a single work or a set of facsimiles of a work (e.g., a set
of JPG images with different sizes and compression ratios, or,
for video, different bandwidth encodings, different video frame
sizes, and different encoding schemes). Supported work/media
types include video, audio, image, text, PDF, HTML.
A ManifestCore structure will often be packaged inside an
enveloping ManifestContainer structure. The enclosing Man-
ifestContainer contains additional information to validate a
media object, as well as signatures from the publisher and
other parties.
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Name Type Description
Version number The structure version. This document describes version 1.
CoreManifest ManifestCore ManifestCore authenticates a media object and associated metadata. To authenticate
a media object, a ManifestCore and one or more FacsimileDescriptors (embedded in
the FacsimileInformation) data structure are required.
FacsimileInfo FacsimileInformation A container for one or more FacsimileDescriptors that cryptographically authenticate
media objects. Note that FacsimileInformation may contain descriptors for a subset
of the Facsimiles described by the manifest (to reduce storage and bandwidth when
not all FacsimileDescriptors are required.)
PublisherAttestation PublisherAttestation Manifest signatures and certificates from the publisher (optional)
LedgerAttestation LedgerAttestation Manifest signatures and certificates from ledger (or other) services (optional)
ManifestLocator string An optional string that helps locate the manifest or additional
FacsimileDescriptors (optional)
TABLE V
MANIFESTCONTAINER STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
The ManifestCore does not directly contain the Facsimi-
leDescriptors that authenticate a facsimile; instead, a Mani-
festCore contains (essentially) an array of hashes of Facsimi-
leDescriptors. The FacsimileDescriptors themselves are stored
outside the ManifestCore - often in an enclosing Facsimile-
Information structure. This saves storage and bandwidth if a
manifest is being used to authenticate just one or a subset of
the defined Facsimiles.
In addition to cryptographically authenticating a work, a
ManifestCore contains an optional publisher assigned meta-
data identifying the publisher (PublisherInfo), and the work
being authenticated (WorkInfo). These structures can also
reference external metadata.
The ManifestCore allows the expression of “authorized
derivation” of a work by services such as social platforms,
CDNs, or publishing tools. To support this, a ManifestCore can
contain a back-pointer to other ManifestCores called Origin
Manifests. If the work is a simple transcoding of another work,
then this will point to the manifest for the original work. If the
work is a composite of several originals, then the ManifestCore
can point back to several originals.
All cryptographic digests in a ManifestCore and related
structures must use the hashing algorithm described in Mani-
festCore (HashingAlgorithm). The ManifestID is the hash of
a canonical representation of a manifest. Currently, this is the
hash of a canonical CBOR-encoding of the manifest.
In this structure, “FacsimileInfoDigests”: “type”: [“ar-
ray”,“null”],“items”: “type”: [“string”,“null”].
C. PublisherInfo
The PublisherInfo structure in Table VII is a container
for information about the publisher or redistributor of this
manifest.
D. OtherClaims
OtherClaims (Table VIII) is a container for additional claims
to be associated with a publisher, work, facsimile, or trans-
formation. ManifestCores natively support a minimal amount
of metadata. Publishers may choose to include or reference
additional metadata about the work, the facsimile, the trans-
formation, or the publisher using this data structure. Two types
of extension are supported: (1) EmbeddedClaims is any string-
encoded data that is embedded in manifest itself, and (2)
ExternalClaims is a pointer (e.g. an URL, file name or GUID)
to an external data object. Optionally, ExternalClaimsDigest
can contain the digest of external data if its integrity must be
protected.
Specifically, “EmbeddedClaims”: “type”: [“string”, “null”]
and “ExternalClaimsDigest”: “type”: [“string”, “null”].
E. WorkInfo
The WorkInfo structure (Table IX) is a container for
publisher- or redistributor-provided information about a work.
This information is the same for all facsimiles described by a
ManifestCore.
F. SourceWorkInfo
SourceWorkInfo (Table X) identifies one or more source
works that were used to produce a derived work.
G. SourceWork
SourceWork (Table XI) identifies the source work in a trans-
formation manifest. It also describes the type of transformation
performed and may optionally contain details about the exact
transformation applied.
H. ManifestReference
A ManifestReference (Table XII) is a description of a
ManifestCore that is stored elsewhere. A ManifestLocator
MUST contain the ManifestID of the referenced manifest and
may optionally include the URI of a service by which the
Manifest can be obtained.
I. TypedDigest
TypedDigest (Table XIII) is a container class for a typed
digest. Most digests used in ManifestCore-related data struc-
tures are simple byte-arrays with the hash algorithm defined
the associated ManifestCore. This data structure is used when
typed digests are required.
J. DerivationSort
The DeriviationSort (Table XIV) is an enumeration that
describes the type of transformation of the original work used
to form a derived work.
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Name Type Description
Version number The structure version. This document describes version 1.
SerialNumber byte[] Statistically unique / random serial number for the manifest
DigestAlgorithm string All hashes in this manifest and the contained data structures use the
algorithm stated here
MediaID byte[] A publisher-assigned quasi-unique ID for the work or family of works. The MediaID
can attached to works (e.g., in a metadata field in the file) or encoded
using a watermark.
CreationTime date-time The date/time when this manifest was created. Note that WorkInfo can specify a
different time for the creation of the work.
Publisher PublisherInfo Information about the publisher (or redistributor) that created this manifest
Work WorkInfo Information about the work or works described by this manifest
FacsimileInfoDigests byte[][] An array of hashes of FacsimileInfo structures that are typically delivered in an
enveloping ManifestContainer. The FacsimileInfo structures authenticate the media
objects described by this manifest.
OriginManifests SourceWorkInfo If the manifest is a derived work (transcoding or composite edited work) this data
structure contains the original manifest of manifests, as well as the transformations
that were applied. (optional)
TABLE VI
MANIFESTCORE STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
Name string The name of the publisher
OtherInfo string Any other information that the publisher needs to associate with the work or works (optional)
AdditionalClaims OtherClaims[] Any other information about the publisher that should be associated with this manifest (optional)
TABLE VII
PUBLISHERINFO STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
Name string The name of the publisher
ClaimSort string Publisher chosen identifier for the sort of metadata encoded in this record.
EmbeddedClaims string String encoding of additional metadata (optional)
ExternalClaims string A locator (URI, etc.) of external metadata (optional)
ExternalClaimsDigest byte[] Optional digest of the external metadata. This can be used if the additional metadata is stable
and the publisher wishes to cryptographically commit to the exact metadata at the time of
manifest creation. If this is not required, then this field should be omitted or null. (optional)
TABLE VIII
OTHERCLAIMS STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
Title string The name or title of the work or family of works
Title2 string Additional name/title information (optional)
OtherInfo string Optional publisher-chosen data (optional)
Copyright string A copyright notice for the work or family of works (optional)
CreationTime date-time Publisher-chosen original publication or creation time. This need not be the same as the
manifest creation time (optional)
MasterCopyLocator string A stable URI, etc. of a master original (facsimiles may have their own Facsimile
locators) (optional)
Duration number If the work is video or audio this can be the length of the work in 100ns (1e-7 secs)
units (optional)
AdditionalClaims OtherClaims[] Other publisher-provided metadata. (optional)
TABLE IX
WORKINFO STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
OriginManifests SourceWork[] An array of identifiers for the source works,
and how the source works were processed to create the derived work.
TABLE X
SOURCEWORKINFO STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
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Name Type Description
OriginManifest ManifestReference A reference to the manifest of the origin work
DerivationType DerivationSort Describes the transformation of the source work to form
the derived work: e.g. a simple transcoding.
AdditionalClaims OtherClaims[] Any other information about the transformation that was applied
to the original to produce the derived work transformation,
for example, EIDR claims. (optional)
TABLE XI
SOURCEWORK STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
Version number The structure version. This document describes version 1.
ManifestLocator string An optional field to encode a service, file, etc. that can
be used to locate the referenced manifest (optional)
ManifestID TypedDigest The ManifestID (manifest digest) of the referenced manifest
TABLE XII
MANIFESTREFERENCE STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
DigestAlgorithm string The digest/hash algorithm used to create this digest
DigestValue byte[] The digest/hash value
TABLE XIII
TYPEDDIGEST STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
Transcoded 1 The derived work is a simple transcoding of the original work
CompleteCopy 2 The entire original work is included in the derived work
PartialCopy 3 Part of the original is included in the derived work
EditedCopy 4 One or more named editing operations have been applied to the original to produce the derived work
TABLE XIV
DERIVATIONSORT STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
K. FacsimileInformation
The FacsimileInformation structure (Table XV) is a con-
tainer structure for one or more TaggedFacsimileDescriptors.
L. TaggedFacsimileDescriptor
A TaggedFacsimileDescriptor (Table XVI) is a container for
a FacsimileDescriptor. The index is the array index of the hash
of the FacsimileDescriptor in the associated ManifestCore.
M. FacsimileDescriptor
A facsimile is a particular encoding or representation of
a work and is represented by a FacsimileDescriptor (Ta-
ble XVII). A ManifestCore can describe one facsimile, or a
collection of facsimiles that the publisher deems equivalent:
e.g., a set of videos with different encoding schemes or
parameters. Non-streaming media is cryptographically bound
to the hash/digest of the complete work. Streaming media
can also be progressively authenticated. Progressive authen-
tication is supported using an array of digests of “chunks” of
the media stream. Different scenarios are best supported by
different chunking schemes so the ChunkAuthenticator data
structures come in several forms. The simplest is file-offset
based chunking. Other chunking schemes are also defined, and
more will be added as needed.
N. FacsimileType
A FacsimileType (Table XVIII) is the type of media object
of a Facsimile. Note that a video stream may be decomposed
into separate video, audio, and muxed facsimiles.
O. ChunkAuthenticator
ChunkAuthenticator (Table XIX) is the base class for
various ways that the chunks of a streaming work can be
authenticated. Chunks are always authenticated by the hash
of a chunk, but the definition of a chunk (e.g., its size, or
how chunk boundaries are established) can vary. Concrete
variations are defined by different derived structures with
different ChunkingScheme values.
P. SimpleChunkListAuthenticator
SimpleChunkListAuthenticator (Table XX) describes
file/stream-offset based chunking. For example, if ChunkSize
in 1MiByte, then the first chunk is the first MiByte of the
media object/file, the second chunk is the second MiByte,
etc. The last chunk in a file/stream can be smaller.
Q. IsoBoxAuthenticator
IsoBoxAuthenticator (Table XXI) describes chunks of mul-
timedia data encoded in an MPEG/ISO container.
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Name Type Description
Version number The structure version. This document describes version 1.
Records TaggedFacsimileDescriptor[] An array of FacsimileDescriptors tagged with an
index that is the location in ManifestCore.FacsimileInfoDigests.
TABLE XV
FACSIMILEINFORMATION STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
Index number The zero-based array index into ManifestCore.FacsimileInfoDigests
that contains the digest of this FacsimileDescriptor
Facsimile FacsimileDescriptor The crypotographic descriptor of a Facsimile
TABLE XVI
TAGGEDFACSIMILEDESCRIPTOR STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
FacsimileMajorType FacsimileType Media type of this facsimile (video, audio, muxed, etc.)
ContainerType string The name of the file/container format for this multimedia,
e.g., JPG or MP4.
EncodingInformation string String-encoded encoding scheme and parameters for this particular
facsimile. If this is a muxed stream, then this will contain the video
encoder info, and EncodingInformation2 will contain the audio
encoding info
EncodingInformation2 string If this Facsimile contains more than one media type, then this is the
secondary type. E.g. the audio encoder type for an AV muxed
stream. (optional)
Length number Length, in bytes, of the facsimile
ObjectDigest byte[] Digest of the entire work using the hash algorithm in the containing
Amp Manifest
FacsimileLocator string Any other information about facsimile that should be associated
with this (optional)
ObjectContainers string If missing or null, then the data hashes to obtain the ObjectDigest
is the entire object - e.g., the JPG or MP4 file. If the data to be hashed
is wrapped in a container format and not all of the data in the
enveloping file/stream should be hashed, then this field which
containers/streams should be hashed (placeholder/todo) (optional)
AdditionalClaims OtherClaims[] Any other data that the publisher wishes to associate
with the facsimile. (optional)
ChunkData Array of any One or more chunked representations of the facsimile. Only needed for
SimpleChunkListAuthenticator progressive authentication of streaming media objects, )
IsoBoxAuthenticator otherwise null or omitted. (optional
MerkleTreeAuthenticator
TABLE XVII
FACSIMILEDESCRIPTOR STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
Unknown 0 Facsimile type is not known or is not specified
MuxedAV 1 Multiplexed AV stream
Video 2 Video stream (no audio)
Audio 3 Audio stream
Image 4 Any sort of image
Text 5 Any sort of text
TABLE XVIII
FACSIMILETYPE STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
ChunkingScheme number This tag indicates the actual type of this structure
NumChunks number The number of chunks described by this authenticator
ChunkDigest byte[][] An ordered array of chunk-hashes starting from the beginning
of the work. All ChunkAuthenticators have a list of chunk digests,
but specific authenticators may have additional data that describe exactly
what each chunk maps to (e.g. file offset-based, I-frame-to-I-frame, etc.)
TABLE XIX
CHUNKAUTHENTICATOR STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
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Name Type Description
ChunkingScheme number SimpleChunkList is ChunkingScheme 1
ChunkSize number All chunks are this size (optional)
NumChunks number The number of chunks described by this authenticator)
ChunkDigest byte[][] An ordered array of chunk-hashes starting from the beginning of the work. All
ChunkAuthenticators have a list of chunk digests, but specific authenticators may have additional
data that describe exactly what each chunk maps to (e.g. file offset-based, I-frame-to-I-frame, etc.)
TABLE XX
SIMPLECHUNKLISTAUTHENTICATOR STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
ChunkingScheme number Iso-box chunking is ChunkingScheme 2
NumChunks number The number of chunks described by this authenticator
ChunkDigest byte[][] An ordered array of chunk-hashes starting from the beginning of the work. All
ChunkAuthenticators have a list of chunk digests, but specific authenticators may have additional
data that describe exactly what each chunk maps to (e.g. file offset-based, I-frame-to-I-frame, etc.)
TABLE XXI
ISOBOXAUTHENTICATOR STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
R. MerkleTreeAuthenticator
MerkleTreeAuthenticator supports chunk authentication us-
ing a Merkle hash tree. This style of chunk authentication
minimizes the amount of data that needs to be downloaded
to authenticate the first chunk (including the case where
playback starts in the middle of the file.) We use the following
terminology: the top-hash is the root of the tree, also referred
to as row zero. The two children of the top-hash are row
one, and so on. The hashes in the final row in the hash tree
are also called the leaves of the tree. The leaves of the tree
are the hashes of the media chunks using the hash algorithm
specified in the manifest. If the number of chunks is not a
power of two, then the tree is padded with leaves with zero-
values: e.g., 32 bytes of zero in the case of a sha256 hash tree.
The number of hashes in the ChunkAuthenticator to support
the MerkleTreeAuthenticator must always be a power of two
(todo, we could relax this), and the hash algorithm used is the
algorithm in the containing manifest. The hash tree is typically
split into two parts at a row called the split-row. The upper part
of the tree - from the root to the split-row - is encoded in the
MerkleTreeAuthenticator (Table XXII) and hence distributed
with the manifest. The lower part of the tree is distributed
with the media itself. The MerkleTreeAuthenticator contains
the row of hashes at the split-row, with the row number given
by the EncodedRow field. The number of hashes encoded
will always be a power of two. If needed, the tree up to
the root can be calculated by repeated hashing. Rows below
the split-row can be derived from the media itself, or can be
derived from the media and fragments of the hash tree called
“evidence” sent by other means. It is out of scope of the
manifest specification to describe how evidence is encoded,
but we expect that each media chunk will be distributed with
an array of hashes that allow clients to verify that the hash of
a chunk of media data is one of the leaves of the complete
hash tree.
S. PublisherAttestation
PublisherAttestation (Table XXIII) is a container class for
publisher-created signatures, etc.
T. LedgerAttestation
LedgerAttestation (Table XXIV) is a container class for
ledger-created signatures, etc.
APPENDIX D
CCF DETAILS
Manifests are recorded on a public blockchain using CCF.
CCF operates the public ledger (i.e., blockchain) of published
works, essentially a list of manifests, relying on a distributed
network of replicas running on trusted hardware and synchro-
nized using Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [31]
or Raft [3]. CCF supports the registration of new manifests and
issues signed manifest receipts. These receipts complement
the producer’s signatures; they enable any media consumers
to independently verify that the work they receive has been
published with the corresponding metadata. CCF also supports
online querying and validation of ledger transactions and their
endorsing certificates, as well as the transparent governance
of the service by a consortium of media producers.
a) Governance: CCF provides a flexible governance
model. This allows for AMP to define the governance by
writing scripts in scripting languages such as the Lua [32]
or JavaScript [33] languages. These scripts specify rules for
actions such as adding new members, adding or removing
users, adding and removing nodes from the system, user
access control, etc. The specifics of the governance model
will be defined as part of the media consortium that controls
AMP, and these rules will evolve with time by modifying the
governance scripts.
b) Trust and Integrity: CCF is designed to support two
different types of consensus algorithms including Crash Fault
Tolerance (CFT) and Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT). The
CFT variant that CCF supports is a modified version of
Raft [3], and the variant of BFT implemented by CCF is
a modified version of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(PBFT) [31]. Raft leverages trusted execution environments
(TEEs) and specifically Intel’s SGX. Its trust model is that
a single TEE compromise destroys both confidentiality and
integrity. By using this trust model, CCF is able to utilize a
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Name Type Description
ChunkingScheme number Hash-Tree-chunking is ChunkingScheme 3
EncodedRow number The row of the tree that is encoded in this authenticator. Zero means that only the root
hash is encoded, 1 means that the pair of hashes at row 1 of the Merkle tree is encoded. -1 means
that the hashes are the leaf hashes.
NumChunks number The number of chunks described by this authenticator
ChunkDigest byte[][] An ordered array of chunk-hashes starting from the beginning of the work. All
ChunkAuthenticators have a list of chunk digests, but specific authenticators may have additional data
that describe exactly what each chunk maps to (e.g. file offset-based, I-frame-to-I-frame, etc.)
TABLE XXII
MERKLETREEAUTHENTICATOR STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
CoseSignatureToken byte[] COSE Signature1 signature block (optional)
JsonWebToken string String-encoded JSON signature block (optional)
PemEncodedCertificates string[] Certificate chain for the signing key ordered from the
self-signed root, through the subordinate CAs, to the key used to sign the manifest (optional)
TABLE XXIII
PUBLISHERATTESTATION STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
Name Type Description
LedgerAttestationValue string (optional)
TABLE XXIV
LEDGERATTESTATION STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION.
variant of Raft which can handle malicious attacks as long
as Intel’s SGX is not compromised. PBFT is a consensus
algorithm that can make progress if less than 1/3 of the nodes
are actively malicious. PBFT’s trust model is that a single TEE
compromise destroys confidentiality but f+1 compromises (in a
3f+1 network) are required to destroy integrity. This distinction
means that even if some of the CCF nodes, which are running
in a SGX enclave, are compromised, the Media Provenance
Ledger will not lose integrity. This added security comes at
an increased performance and latency cost when committing
data to the ledger. Critically, both of these consensus protocols
offer finality. This property states that once a transaction has
been committed, it cannot be reverted. Furthermore, a CCF
receipt provides an additional finality proof.
c) Distributed Execution: CCF utilizes TEEs to ensure
that the operator of the Media Provenance Ledger is not able
to perform malicious acts on the service. This is designed to
provide the AMP consortium members with confidence that
they can run the ledger service in a cloud datacenter, and that
an operator (such as Azure) cannot compromise the service’s
confidentiality or integrity.
